One final task was required before these elites could safely move forward. They had to ensure that all the evidence of their complicity in deliberately starting the war in 1914 and prolonging it beyond 1915, was removed. The consequences had been horrendous but the blame had to be diverted elsewhere. The truth had to be buried. This task fell to Herbert Hoover, a trusted placement, who also had a proprietary interest in hiding his own fraudulent involvement in the Commission for Relief in Belgium. (see blogs on Belgian Relief) On the basis that his involvement was kept ‘entirely confidential’, Ephraim Adams, professor of history at Stanford University, a close friend of Hoover’s from their student days, was called to Paris to coordinate a great heist of documentary evidence pertaining to the war and its true origins, from countries across Europe and dress it in a cloak of academic respectability.
Had Adams been genuine, or cared about protecting the original sources so precious to academic historians, he would have had no need for confidentiality. Indeed at the start of his secret mission he appeared to recognise that he had been given a wonderful opportunity to capture a unique experience for future researchers. Adams resolved to keep a diary, detailing the names of those whom he met and what they brought with them, but stopped after a week on the spurious excuse that he was making too many contacts and the work was too interesting ‘to suffer interruption by recording them.’  The task had to be undertaken immediately. Speed was of the essence. Adams was in Paris by 11 June with no plan of action, other than follow Hoover’s instructions that all the stolen or illegally procured documentation was sent to Stanford University in California. It was about as distant a destination from the European theatre as could be imagined.
Nothing was too unimportant. Decisions about relevance were left to a later date. Two years later Adams still hadn’t even begun the process of creating a catalogue of the treasures he had syphoned off, on the rather spurious basis that doing so too early led to ‘disappointment and vexation’.  In Belgium, for example, access to government records was facilitated by ‘M. Emile Francqui, mining engineer and a banker of world reputation’.  Of course it was. Who else knew where all of the skeletons from the Belgian Relief scandal were buried? Francqui, whose all-powerful Belgian bank, the Societe Generale, ended the war cash rich and thriving beyond its dreams,  was the one man who knew exactly what evidence had to be removed immediately. Why have historians and investigative journalists failed to unmask this charade? Hoover and Francqui orchestrated the removal of documents that enabled the myth of Belgian Relief to flourish while masking its sinister role.
Hoover had many powerful friends. He persuaded General John Pershing to release fifteen history professors and students serving in various ranks of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe and sent them, in uniform, to the countries his ‘humanitarian’ relief agency was feeding. With food in one hand and reassurance in the other, these agents faced little resistance in their quest. They were primarily interested in material relating to the war’s origins and the workings of the Commission for Relief of Belgium.
They made the right contacts, ‘snooped’ around for archives and found so many that Hoover ‘was soon shipping them back to the US as ballast in the empty food boats’.  He recruited an additional 1,000 agents whose first haul amounted to 375,000 volumes of the ‘Secret War Documents’ of European governments.  Hoover donated a $50,000 ‘gift’ for the task. That would only have paid for around seventy of these agents for a year. It has not proved possible for us to discover from what source the remaining nine-hundred men were paid.
Hoover’s backers claimed that there would only be ten years within which the most valuable material could be ‘acquired’. According to Ephraim Adams, Hoover himself estimated that the process of ‘collecting’ would go on for twenty-five years  but it could take ‘a thousand years’ to catalogue the material. The collection was accelerated to a ‘frenzied pace’.  How convenient. The official propaganda insisted that the work was urgent, but it would take a millennium to catalogue. The secret removal and disposal of incriminatory British and French material posed little or no problem for the Secret Elite, and, once the Bolsheviks had taken control, access to Russian documents proved straightforward. Professor Miliukov, foreign minister in the old Kerensky regime, informed Hoover that some of the czarist archives from the origins of the war had been concealed in a barn in Finland. Hoover later boasted that ‘Getting them was no trouble at all. We were feeding Finland at the time.’ 
The Secret Elite thus took possession of a mass of evidence from the old czarist regime that undoubtedly contained hugely damaging information on Sarajevo and Russia’s secret mobilisation. Likewise, damning correspondence between the Russian foreign ministry and its representatives in Paris and Belgrade has been ‘lost’ to posterity. All Russian diplomatic papers from 1914 were removed from their archives by an unknown person. These were documents of momentous importance that would have proved that Germany had not caused the First World War.
It might at first appear strange that the Bolsheviks cooperated so willingly by allowing Hoover’s agents to remove 25 carloads of material from Petrograd.  According to the New York Times, Hoover’s team bought the Bolshevik documents from a ‘doorkeeper’ for $200 cash,  but there were darker forces at play. As we have previously documented, the Bolshevik leaders were beholden to American bankers closely linked to the Secret Elite and were in the process of selling off the best of Russian resources to them.
The removal of documents from Germany presented few problems. Fifteen carloads of material were taken, including ‘the complete secret minutes of the German Supreme War Council’, a ‘gift’ from Friedrich Ebert, first president of the post-war German Republic. Hoover explained that Ebert was ‘a radical with no interest in the work of his predecessors’,  but the starving man will exchange even his birthright for food. Hoover’s people also acquired 6,000 volumes of court documents covering the complete official and secret proceedings of the Kaiser’s preparations for war should France and Russia mobilise against her. Where then is the vital evidence to prove Germany’s guilt? Had there been proof it would have been released immediately. There was none.
By 1926, the ‘Hoover War Library’ was so packed with documentary material that it was legitimately described as the largest in the world dealing with the First World War.  In reality, this was no library. While the documents were physically housed within Stanford, the collection was kept separate and only individuals with the highest authorisation and a key to the padlock were allowed access. In 1941, 22 years after Hoover began the task of secreting away the real history of the First World War, selected documents were made available to the public. What was withheld from view or destroyed will never be known. Suffice to say that no First World War historian has ever reproduced or quoted any controversial material housed in what is now known as the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. Indeed, it is a startling fact that few if any war historians have ever written about this illicit theft of European documents relating to arguably the most crucially important event in European and world history, and their concealment in California. Why? They were stealing history to protect themselves.
In a sense this whole protracted world war, justified by lies, prolonged by profiteers and politicians with hidden agendas, subjected to false histories, suffered by nations in debt and by ordinary people through irreparable loss, did not end. All of the consequences of war were sucked into the vortex of a grossly unfair peace. Furthermore, the ‘hidden powers’, the ‘money-power’, ‘the power behind the curtain’ who had ordained the war were more secure in their control of the developed world by the end of 1919. Versailles did not mark the end. It provided a forum for the new elite to regroup and draw breath. Worse was to come.
1. Ephraim Adams, The Hoover War Collection at Stanford University, California; a report and an analysis, (1921), p. 7. https://archive.org/details/cu31924031034360.
3. Adams, The Hoover War Collection , (1921), p. 36.
5. Whittaker Chambers, Hoover Library http://whittakerchambers.org/articles/time-a/hoover-library/%5D
6. New York Times, 5 February 1921.
7. Adams, The Hoover War Collection, p. 5.
8. Cissie Dore Hill, Collecting the Twentieth Century, p. 1 at http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/8041.
9. Chambers, Hoover Library at http://whittakerchambers.org/articles/time-a/hoover-library/
11. New York Times, 5 February 1921.
12. Chambers, Hoover Library, as above.
13. New York Times, 5 February 1921.