GUEST BLOG: Professor Hans Fenske (4) A Peace To End All Peace

The armistice of 11 November 1918, made it impossible for the German Reich to restart the battle and was tantamount to an unconditional surrender. In terms of international law it was questionable, since it contained conditions of a political nature – the annulment of the Eastern peace treaties – and because it permitted the continuation of the British blockade until peace was finally concluded. Since a blockade constituted a combat operation, it should have been suspended as soon as the armistice began. In addition, the Allies continued their stance of refusing peace talks with the enemies even after 11 November. They negotiated the peace treaty only among themselves. The main features were defined during a British-French-Italian pre-conference that took place in London in December 1918. They also decided to put Emperor Wilhelm II. on trial. President Wilson was unhappy with the result of the pre-conference and told his delegation that he demanded a just peace. He threatened that if Lloyd George and Clemenceau were not to ease up on their demands, he would depart and conclude a separate peace with Germany. However, he did not follow through with this threat because he feared for the League of Nations that he endorsed.

During the peace conference formally opened in Paris on 18 January 1919 consultations on all important issues were conducted within the close circle made up of the leading politicians from the US, Great Britain, France, Italy, and initially, also Japan. There were numerous commissions, but due to a lack of time, the politicians were not able to thoroughly deliberate upon their submissions. Due to Clemenceau’s hard line, talks were temporarily very controversial. Lloyd George realised that Clemenceau strove to attain excessive goals. In a comprehensive memorandum issued in late March, he urged that the conditions imposed on Germany be more moderate so that the peace treaty should not be a reason for embitterment.

Clemenceau rejected this memorandum outright and successfully insisted on his hard-line approach. When the German delegation arrived in Versailles on 29 April, the treaty was not yet concluded. So they were detained in hotels for the time being. On the morning of 7 May, only a few hours before the hand-over, it was finally ready in printed form; up to that moment, no-one had been able to read and evaluate it in its entirety. The German delegation considered it unacceptable and developed several counter-propositions by the end of May, but nearly all of them were rejected. The German government then recommended that the National Assembly in Weimar accept the treaty which it did on 22 June, with the exception of articles 227 – 231. These were concerned about bringing the German Emperor to trial and convicting war criminals. Article 231 made Germany and its allies liable for all the loss and damage they had caused by foisting this war upon Europe. The victorious powers did not accept this. Instead they gave an ultimatum to sign the treaty and the National Assembly complied. The formal signing took place on 28 June in the Hall or Mirrors of Versailles Castle, where King Wilhelm I of Prussia had accepted the German Emperorship on 18 January 1871.

For the two German delegates, this act was demeaning. The young British diplomat Harold Nicolson found it abominable. On the day of the second vote in the National Assembly, on 23 June, Quartermaster General Groener said in the Supreme Army Command, that not to accept it would result in bringing on a war of total annihilation by France against Germany. In that case, the Allies would have restarted their advance – so Weimar knew from American sources – and separated Southern Germany from the North, given separate peace treaties to the southern states and also detached the Rhineland from Germany. Clemenceau wanted to form an independent state on the left banks of the Rhine which was to constitute an economic and military system together with Belgium, Luxemburg and France.

The Treaty of Versailles was very tough. Germany lost nearly one seventh of its territory and one tenth of its population. Half the iron ore and one quarter of the coal production as well as one seventh of agricultural production were taken from her. German colonies and all foreign possessions of the Reich were lost. Most of the commercial fleet had to be handed over and long-term economic discrimination accepted. The army and navy had to decrease their size quite considerably. The Rhineland was de-militarised, split in three zones and occupied by Allied forces for five to fifteen years. The Saarland was put under the mandate of the League of Nations. The coal mines went to France and Gdansk with its surrounding area was turned into a Free City of Poland with special rights. The independence of Austria, whose National Assembly had voted to accept the connection to the German Reich, was to be guaranteed in perpetuity. The amount of reparations was to be determined at a later time. That the sum to be compiled would be very high, and paying it would take several decades, was beyond doubt. In the line of European peace treaties concluded since the 17th century, the Treaty of Versailles was nearly unique in that there was no negotiation with the conquered party. Only one peace treaty was comparable: the one Napoleon imposed upon Prussia in Tilsit in 1807.

Before the signing of the treaty, President Wilson said that if he were a German, he would not sign it. His foreign minister Lansing considered the conditions imposed on Germany as unutterably hard and abasing, many of them impossible to comply with. His adviser, Mandell House wrote in his diary on 29 June that the treaty was bad and should never have been concluded; its execution would bring no end of difficulties over Europe. And Delcassé, who had done a great deal for the onset of war and who in 1914 wanted to shatter Bismarck’s achievements, voted against the treaty’s ratification in the French chamber. He told a journalist that one could not urge a nation of 60 million people to pay a toll to another for 44 years. This would be nearly like forcing this nation to start a new war. As a matter of fact, regulating the issue of reparations had fatal consequences indeed. In early 1921, the total amount claimed from Germany was determined to be 226 billion gold Marks, a few months later, after Germany had protested, this was reduced to 132 billion. France used a small arrear in the delivering of commodities that Germany had to come up with to occupy the Ruhr, Germany’s most important industrial district. In doing so, France hoped to be able to sever the Rhineland from Germany and to be able to moreover loosen the cohesion of the Reich.

The occupation of the Ruhr constituted a clear breach of the Treaty of Versailles. In Germany, it caused strong national emotions, but it also caused Great Britain to step out of the restraint it so far had shown towards France and get it to the negotiation table. Thus came about the Dawes plan in 1924, which set up an interim regulation regarding the reparations, a guarantee of the German-French border in 1925, and the admission of Germany into the League of Nations in 1926. The final fixing of the reparation burden was brought about by the Hague Conference in January 1930, whose main content had become known as early as mid- 1929.

According to this co-called Young Plan, the Reich would have to pay a total of 116 billion Marks over 58 years, i.e. until 1988. The first annual rate amounted to 1.8 billion Marks, which constituted 26% of the national budget of the Reich in 1928, a very high amount. A petition initiated by the German National People’s Party, by “Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten” [literally: “steel helmet, alliance of front-line soldiers”] and by the National Socialists, made a referendum possible. This was not successful, but the NSDAP unremittingly continued its fight against what it called the “tribute madness”, receiving very widespread positive reactions. At the Reichstag election in May 1928, it had only been a splinter party getting a mere 2.6% of valid votes, but during the new elections in September 1930 it received 18.3% of the votes; it thus increased its result seven times. The party leadership attributed this acceptance by 6.5 million voters to a very large part to their decisive stance against the Young Plan. With this successful election, the Party had laid a solid base for its further growth. That the party leader, Hitler, would finally be empowered to claim the position of Reich Chancellor for himself was also connected to the Treaty of Versailles.

In order to be able to have access to the national socialist storm troops in case of potential violent actions by Poland against the Eastern parts of Germany, which could not be excluded, and thus to be able to strengthen the all too weak Reichswehr, Reich President Hindenburg wanted to shift further to the right, and had Papen promise the NSDAP his agreement on new general elections in return for tolerating the new government he had just appointed. These elections in late July of 1932 brought in 37.4% of the votes for the NSDAP. Within only a few months, this resulted in the situation which saw Hitler become Reich Chancellor on 30 January 1933, being able to build up his dictatorship thereafter. Six years later, the issue of Gdansk and the so called Polish corridor which, according to the Treaty of Versailles, separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany, constituted the starting point of the German-Polish conflict which led up to the Second World War. Thus came true what Lloyd George had feared back in March 1919, namely that accommodating Poland too much would sooner or later result in another war in Eastern Europe.

As mentioned in the introductory passage, Swiss citizen Ernst Sauerbeck accused the Entente in 1919 of having unleashed the war without need, of without need having prolonged it, and of again without need having ended it by means of a calamitous peace. This judgement proved to be correct. If, at the turn of the year 1917/18, the Allied forces had agreed on the German peace offer, or if they had accepted, like the German Reich, the mediation offer by Wilson, the war would surely have been ended by a treaty that both sides would have been able to live with. And if in 1919 the statesmen of the two Anglo-Saxon powers had prevented that a Clemenceau peace was imposed upon Germany, Europe would also have been spared much harm.

GUEST BLOG: Professor Hans Fenske (3) Towards A Prolonged Conclusion

In February 1917, the German Empire re-embarked on unlimited submarine war, causing the United States to enter the war on the Entente side in April. However, it was only at the beginning of 1918 that American troops were deployed on a large scale in France. The hope that England would give in within a few months as a result of the submarine warfare remained unfulfilled. The war continued to be a standoff.

In the spring of 1917, the Austrian leadership feared that the Danube Monarchy would not be able to continue the war beyond the coming winter. Emperor Karl I. and the new Foreign Secretary Czernin thus urged Berlin for new peace talks to be held. Bethmann-Hollweg confirmed his preparedness for talks, but he also said that at that point, the war could only be ended by the Central Powers submitting to the will of the Allies. They would have to wait and see how the revolution in Russia would progress. There had been workers’ unrests in March, the Czar had abdicated because of them, his brother had renounced his right for succession to the throne. The new Republican government continued the war.

In mid-April, the Russian Council of People’s Commissioners offered a general peace without annexations and compensations. In Germany, the Social Democrats at once supported this offer. Even Matthias Erzberger of the Centre Party who occasionally travelled abroad on behalf of the German government, supported it. He was the main initiator of the resolution adopted by the Reichstag on 19 July. With a clear majority, the Parliament expressed itself in favour of a peace of understanding and lasting reconciliation of the peoples against forced cessions of territory and economic and financial rape. Only an economic peace would enable a friendly coexistence of the peoples. The Reichstag also advocated the creation of international rights organisations but the Supreme Army Command was against this resolution. Bethmann-Hollweg thought it inappropriate at that moment in time and thus lost the confidence of the parties advocating the resolution. On 13 July, he stepped down from office.

His successor, Georg Michaelis, avowed himself at the beginning of the debate about the resolution to the lasting reconciliation of the peoples and to a peace of understanding, but one which would have to be able to safeguard Germany’s interests in Europe and overseas. Lloyd George, by now the British Prime Minister, called this speech a sign of commitment to war and to achieving a false peace.

On 1 August, Pope Benedict XV. called upon the warring parties to enter into peace talks. He advocated an obligatory arbitral jurisdiction for all international issues, the settlement of all territorial disputes in a spirit of conciliation, the mutual waiving of war reparations, disarmament and the freedom of the seas. This appeal had been agreed upon by nuncio Pacelli with the leadership of the Reich in late June. An official German comment was published only in mid-September, expressing the spirited hope that the Papal initiative be successful. This declaration was immediately handed over to the press. In doing so, the Reich government once again, like so many times before, made a public commitment to reconciliation. The Allies rejected the Papal proposition right away, Wilson did so very decisively. On 1 November, Michaelis stepped down from office. The new Chancellor Georg Graf von Hertling held no different attitude towards peace than its two predecessors.

In Russia, the Bolsheviks came to power following an uprising on 7 November. Lenin, the chairman of the now ruling Council of the People’s Commissioners, declared on 9 November in front of the Council congress that his government would offer peace to all warring nations on the basis of Soviet conditions, i.e. no annexations and contributions, and the right of self-determination to the peoples. This was also written in his decree for peace. The Central Powers agreed to his request for an armistice. On 4 December, a cease-fire went into effect to bring on a long-term and honourable peace for all parties. The negotiations started on 22 December in Brest-Litowsk. During the session on 25 December, Czernin called the Russian principles a basis worth discussing. Should that happen, the governments of all warring nations would have to commit themselves to respecting them.

It was decided to ask the Allies for a statement in this sense within ten days. Therewas no response. The Western powers equally disregarded an invitation by the Russian Foreign Commissar to take part in the peace negotiations. A conversation initiated by Czernin between an Austrian diplomat and the South-African politician Jan Smuts, a member of the British Imperial War Cabinet, which took place in Bern in late December, also brought no results.

The Central Powers’ draft for a peace treaty with Russia was very succinct. It demanded that the Russian government take notice of the will of the people to give full sovereignty to Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and parts of Estonia and Livonia. Further articles regulated the entry into force once again of the treaties effective before the war, and mutual renunciation of the replacement of war losses and the restitution of war expenses. The Soviet leadership was not united in their stance on this treaty. Lenin expected a world revolution, so he thought that the treaty would not to be valid for long so he might just as well sign it. Foreign Commissar Trotsky proposed to simply abandon the war and a majority was in favour of this. After returning to Brest-Litovsk, he first tried to delay the negotiations, and on 18 February 1918 he declared in the political commission that Russia would not sign the treaty but rather leave the war and hope that other peoples would follow suit. The Central Powers judged this a cancellation of the armistice, correctly according to international law, and  restarted their military advance. Soon afterwards, the Central Committee gave in and signed the treaty  which included some new amendments regarding Central Asia and Armenia. Peace was concluded on 3 March.

From June to August, supplementary German-Russian agreements were negotiated in Berlin. There it was agreed that the Central Powers were to withdraw their troops from the Russian areas they had occupied. Ending the combat operations in the East enabled the Supreme Army Command to deploy troops to the Western front. The Germany offensive which started there in late March was particularly intended to hit British troops in order to make London more willing to talk. At first, the German army was very successful, but in early June, they came to a halt. Starting in July, the Allied forces successively pushed back the German troops. Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers in 1915. In mid-September 1918, the Allied forces broke through the front there. By the end of the same month, the country had to surrender unconditionally. Now Hindenburg, the Head of the Supreme Army Command, demanded that the German government ask President Wilson to mediate an armistice. For this, he found agreement in Berlin. The crown council decided on 29 September to introduce the parliamentary system in order to improve the odds for a beneficial peace.

Hertling was against this and stepped down. Prince Max von Baden became the new Reich Chancellor. Thanks to his long-standing activities in caring for prisoners of war, he was well-regarded even abroad. He had spoken publicly in favour of a League of Nations, and in interior politics he was ready to conduct reforms. On the very same day he was appointed, i.e. on the evening of 3 October, he asked President Wilson via Switzerland for a peace treaty on the basis of the “Fourteen Points” of 8 January 1918, and in order to prevent further bloodshed, for the immediate conclusion of an armistice. The Danube Monarchy followed suit one day later, the Ottoman Empire soon after. Wilson delayed fulfilling this plea for an immediate armistice by five weeks because the Allies first wanted to improve their military position.

On 5 November, U.S. Secretary of State Lansing declared that the Allies were now ready for an armistice which would secure them the absolute power to enforce the details of the peace accepted by the German government. This delay cost the lives of some 10,000 soldiers. During this period, the Danube monarchy collapsed, and in Germany, a revolution broke out in early November. A Council of the People’s Deputies took over government. The armistice signed in the early morning of 11 November stipulated that battles should end at noon, 11 am British time.

GUEST BLOG: Professor Hans Fenske (2) Early German Peace Proposals

Right away, the war was ideologically charged by the Allies. During a tour of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Asquith – in Edinburgh, in September – called the war a crusade against the arrogance of a single power trying to dominate the development of Europe. In Dublin, he declared the need to prevent small nations being annihilated by an overbearing power, and claimed that the war was about the final abolition of militarism as the ruling factor in the relationships between states. In London, on 9 November, he spoke on the necessary abolition of Prussian militarism, and his fellow party member Lloyd George wanted to see the German people liberated from the hell of the military caste. The speech from the throne of 11 November held that England would continue for as long as it could dictate the peace. All this was accompanied by sharp anti-German propaganda in the media. This even went so far that Germany was frequently called “Barbaria”. The British government was later not to leave their position briefly sketched here.

In France, too, there were demands to break up Prussian militarism. In October 1944, Foreign Minister Delcassé told the Russian ambassador that the aim of France was to annihilate the German Reich and to weaken Prussia’s military and political power as much as possible. In a similar vein, in a memorandum for the French government, Sazonov  in September spoke about the destruction of German power and the German arrogance to be predominant in Europe. On 5 September, the three Entente nations contractually committed themselves not to agree on a separate peace and to talk about their war goals in public only after having consulted their Allies. Several treaties were entered into regarding these goals, even with countries like Italy which only joined the Allies later in the course of the war. The plans were about weakening Germany and destroying the Danube Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, which had joined the war in the autumn of 1914 on the side of the Central Powers.

After the important initial successes of the German army in the West, it could not be excluded that there soon would have to be talks about peace with the opponents. That’s why Bethmann-Hollweg, who stayed in the headquarters at the time, had a catalogue of possible goals compiled – which he expressly declared provisional – which he sent to the state secretaries of the exterior and the interior for revision on 9 September. The proposals required France to commit itself to reparations for the duration of 15 to 20 years to be calculated so that she would not be capable of spending much on armament, but without calling for territorial sacrifices with the exception of the Briey ore basin. Moreover, she should be closely linked to Germany by means of a trade agreement. A different section talked about a Central European economic association under German leadership. Bethmann-Hollweg could most identify with this. But this paper did not represent a firm agenda. With the Marne battle, the German offensive came to a halt, static warfare began, and hopes for the war ending soon had to be given up.

In mid-November, the Prussian War Minister General von Falkenhayn who now led the operations in the West, told the Chancellor that it was impossible to reach a decent peace as long as Russia, France and England stuck together. So they would have to break Russia away from the Entente coalition. Their thinking was that France probably would give in once Russia made peace. Russia should have to pay sufficient war reparations but remain territorially intact, apart from slight corrections along the border. France should also have to pay reparations yet receive an honourable peace, since Germany and France would have to amicably coexist again after the war. Bethmann-Hollweg fully agreed with these considerations. If Russia could not be prised away from the opposing coalition, the war might take a disastrous turn for Germany. If this didn’t happen the prospect of the war ending because of a general mutual weariness without any decisive defeat of one party or the other became likely. Bethmann-Hollweg kept to this opinion thereafter. Now, his aim in war was Germany’s self-assertion. He wanted to get guarantees for its safety, but he explained this only in general terms. Belgium and Poland were not to become the ground for preparing military action against Germany ever again.

Shortly after the conversation of von Falkenhayn and Bethmann-Hollweg, the Danish King Christian X. offered – via the Danish ship owner and state councillor Hans Niels Andersen and the German ship owner Albert Ballin, a friend of Emperor Wilhelm II. – his services in mediating a peace in London and St. Petersburg. Bethmann-Hollweg wanted to delay an answer so as to be able to improve the military position in the East, but von Falkenhayn and the Emperor considered an understanding with Russia to be urgent and gave Andersen a positive answer. During his visit to Petrograd, as the Russian capital was now called, in 1915, Andersen was told by Nicholas II. that he would never leave his Allies in the lurch, and that he was decidedly against a separate peace. The British and French ambassadors, who had come to know about Andersen’s visit, also tried to influence Sazonov in this sense.

When, following Bethmann-Hollweg’s request, Andersen went to Petrograd again in June and in August, he got the same answer. In November of 1914, the Ministry of State also tried to enter into talks with Japan which had declared war on the German Empire in August and had annexed the German leased territory Kiautschou in the Chinese province of Shantung. The state secretary Jagow thought that England could not have any interest in further strengthening Japan. This would offer the German Empire the opportunity to get into closer contact with Japan, provided Germany would accept the loss of Kiautschou.

Then, Japan could mediate with Russia. But this contact effort failed completely. In December 1914, the Japanese ambassador in Stockholm, Uchida, made it known to his German colleague via Swedish intermediaries that Japan was not interested in communicating with Germany. In this, he acted not on orders by his government, but on his own initiative. So these contacts were fruitless. When in early 1916 Uchida first met with the German ambassador in person, he had to declare that according to the London agreement of September 1914, there would be no separate peace and that the German Empire would have to succumb to the peace conditions imposed by the Entente.

Bethmann-Hollweg publicly declared several times that the Reich would be ready to enter into talks provided the offers were appropriate. When talking to Col. Edward Mandel House, a confidant of President Wilson, he declared his sympathy for a step towards peace made by the U.S. As the year went on, there were three more statements in the same vein. In October, he came to an understanding with the Austrian-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Stephan Burián, towards a joint step towards peace. This should happen at a point in time when it could not be construed as a sign of weakness. This was the case after the conquest of Romania. On 12 December, the Central Powers of the Entente submitted the proposal, via neutral countries, to soon enter into peace talks. They would submit proposals to form an appropriate foundation for an enduring peace. They stated this publicly, Bethmann- Hollweg for instance in the German Reichstag. The Allies brusquely refused and declared that Germany and its Allies would have to atone for everything they had committed, as well as providing reparations and security collateral.

They even refused the mediation offer Wilson made on 16 December. They said that currently it was impossible to enter into a peace reflecting their ideas. They wanted the restitution of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro, the handing back of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the cession of all regions with Polish settlements to Russia and the breaking up of the Danube Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. Also, they did not want to allow the Central Powers to take part in peace negotiations on equal terms.

In late January 1917, Wilson again offered the German ambassador his services for reaching a reconciliation between the warring opponents and asked to be informed about the German conceptions. He was told that Germany wanted to win a frontier protecting Germany and Poland against Russia – the Central Powers recently had proclaimed the Kingdom of Poland –, an agreement about colonial matters, certain corrections concerning the border to France, and an economic and financial compensation between the warring opponents.

Following the death of Emperor Franz Joseph in November 1916, his great-nephew Karl stepped up to the top of the Habsburg Empire. After the failed peace offer of December 1916, Karl I was looking for peace options on private routes. In the spring of 1917, his brother-in-law Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, a Belgian officer, conducted several talks in Switzerland, Paris and London, which, however, did not achieve any results.

GUEST BLOG: Professor Hans Fenske (1) The Allied Refusal of Peace Talks 1914–1919

This is the first of four guest blogs from Hans Fenske, Professor of Contemporary History at Freiburg University from 1977-2001 and author of Der Anfang vom Ende des alten Europa. (The Beginning of the End of Old Europe; The Allied Refusal of Peace Talks, 1914-1919.)

A War Germany did not want.

When handing over the peace treaty to the German delegation on 7 May 1919, French Prime Minister Clemenceau stated very brusquely that the most horrible war had been foisted on the Allies, and that now the time of reckoning had come. There would be no spoken negotiations; only remarks concerning the treaty in its entirety would be accepted if submitted in writing within two weeks. In his answer, German Foreign Minister Brockdorff-Rantzau rejected the accusation of exclusive responsibility and demanded that an impartial commission investigate the amount of guilt of all parties concerned.

The victorious Allied powers were not prepared to concede forming an impartial commission to look at the facts, but there were a number of neutral scholars who in their academic work reached a view appropriate to the facts. As early as 1914, the renowned American Professor of Law, John William Burgess declared – after having studied the Blue Books presented by the warring parties – that the Entente held a far greater share of responsibility for the war than Germany and the Danube Monarchy. The Swiss scholar Ernst Sauerbeck confirmed this view in 1919. According to his findings, the Entente had unleashed the war without need and turned it into what it became – the tomb of entire nations. He also accused the victorious powers of having, by means of the Versailles peace treaty, allowed the 1914-1918 war to grow into the direst doom that has possibly ever threatened the world; that is the War that began in 1939.

In addition, experts from Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland, who in 1927 presented their expertise in a volume published by a Norwegian committee investigating the issue of war guilt, assessed the share of guilt of the Central Powers as low. According to Hermann Aall, the committee’s secretary, Russia had provoked the war, and Great Britain played a decisive role in its outbreak. Axel Drolsum of the University of Oslo stated that Germany in 1914 had been the only nation to have tried everything it could to keep the peace, but that it failed due to the will of the other powers to make war.

Moreover, please let reference be made to one voice from a victorious country. In 1924, the French journalist and former diplomat Alcide Ebray recommended a thorough revision of the Treaty of Versailles. He claimed that the Czarist Regime held the decisive share of war guilt, while Germany acted in favour of a conciliatory position in Vienna and St. Petersburg in 1914.

In Serbia, the radical party had been the decisive power since the bloody officers’ putsch back in 1903, during which the Royal couple had been murdered. This party pursued a decidedly anti-Austrian foreign policy which demanded that all Serbs be united within one state. The problem here was the fact that there were about as many Serbs living outside the country as within, particularly in the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Although they nominally still belonged to the Ottoman Empire, they had been under Austrian-Hungarian administration since the Congress of Vienna in 1878. When the Habsburg Empire annexed them in 1908 following an arrangement with Russia, there was a severe international crisis. When this was settled in March 1909, Serbia had to sign a treaty pledging to again maintain good neighbourly relations with the Danube Monarchy. But this did nothing to change Belgrade’s keen antagonism towards Vienna. First, however, Serbian activities were directed towards the South. The war against the Ottoman Empire started by Italy in 1911 to conquer Libya triggered Serbian talks with Bulgaria about whether to join arms against the Turks. After entering into an alliance, the two states started the campaign in the autumn of 1912. Together with Montenegro and Greece, they took away from the Ottoman Empire nearly its entire possessions on the Balkan during the First Balkan War.

This took place with the full assent of Russia, which wanted to get the Bosporus and the Dardanelles under its control and which therefore had a strong interest in effecting changes on the Balkans. Serbia enlarged its territory considerably towards the south. In November 1912, shortly after the beginning of the war, the French ambassador in Belgrade reported to Paris that Serbia was set on bringing down Austria at the first possible occasion. King Peter asked the Russian ambassador whether to enact the downfall the Habsburg Empire now, or whether to still wait. The Russian ambassador relayed this question to St. Petersburg, from where in February 1913 came the answer that Russia was not yet ready for a war against Austria-Hungary. Serbia should content itself with the present increase in territory for now, so that it could later, once the time was ripe, lance the Austrian-Hungarian abscess. Later, more statements of this kind were issued from St. Petersburg: Serbia would find its promised land in Austria-Hungary and should prepare itself for the inevitable battle.

When, in the summer of 1913, Serbia – together with Greece and Romania – turned against Bulgaria in a struggle over the recently conquered land, Russia backed Serbia; it clearly was a satellite of Russia.

At the beginning of 1914, the leadership in St. Petersburg saw Russia far better prepared for a war than the previous year. During a council of war, a decision was taken to use the upcoming war for occupying Constantinople and the Straits. The Russian military gazette expressly declared the Czarist Regime’s readiness for war, and in late March, the head of the military academy declared in front of officers that a war with the Triple Alliance was inevitable and would probably break out in the summer. The Belgian ambassador in St. Petersburg reported to Brussels at the beginning of June that it was to be expected that Russia would soon put its war tools to use. At the same time, Foreign Minister Sazonov exerted pressure in London to quickly conclude the marine convention about which negotiations had been going on for some time. Soon after, he travelled to Romania together with the Czar. There, he asked the Prime Minister how Romania would react should Russia see itself compelled by the events to start hostile actions.

St. Petersburg was well aware that in the case of a big European conflict, Russia would be firmly backed by France and Great Britain. A Russian-French alliance had been in effect since 1894. The British-French understanding about Egypt and Morocco of 1904 was amended from 1905 by firm military agreements made by the General Staffs, about which the Belgian military was kept informed. During his visit to England in September 1912, Sazonov was assured by the British Foreign Minister Grey that in the case of a German-French war, Great Britain would support France by sea and by land, and try to deliver as destructive a blow as possible to German predominance. For Grey, Germany’s strong economic growth presented a grave threat; its weakening was thus a definite necessity for him.

When the Serbian secret society “Unification or Death” planned the murder of Austrian heir apparent Franz Ferdinand in 1914, the head of the Serbian intelligence service, Dragutin Dimitrijević, leader of the putsch of 1903, asked the Russian military attaché, whether this plan was convenient. St. Petersburg sent its consent, although they should have been aware that the Danube monarchy would have no choice but to react harshly to the murder of their heir to the throne. Apparently, Russian leadership thought the moment had arrived to lance the Austrian-Hungarian abscess.

In mid-June, German Reich Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg asked the German ambassador in London to talk with Grey about securing European peace. If another crisis was to erupt in the Balkans, Russia might react more decisively  than before due to its comprehensive rearmament. Whether this would result in a European clash would depend entirely on Great Britain and Germany. If both states were to act as guarantors of peace, then war might be prevented. If not, any arbitrary marginal difference might light the war torch between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Grey’s response to the ambassador was placatory, but of course he did not tell him the truth.

After the Sarajevo murder on 28 June, Austrian Foreign Minister Berchtold and General Chief of Staff Hötzendorf argued for an immediate strike against Serbia. The Hungarian Prime Minister prevented this. They agreed to demand of Serbia absolute clarification about the crime, but to hand over the respective note only after the end of the impending French state visit to Russia. They were sure about German allegiance to Austria in case of complications; a high-level public servant had been given this assurance when visiting Berlin on 5 and 6 July. The relevant German decision makers agreed that Russia would not intervene, so that the conflict could remain localised. That was a crass misjudgement.

During their stay in St. Petersburg on 20 through 23 July, the French guests, President Poincaré and Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Viviani, repeated the assurance of absolute French solidarity in a war against Germany, often given before. Sazonov and Viviani agreed on 23 July that everything must be done to counter the Austrian demand as well as any request which might be construed as a meddling with Serbian independence. The Austrian note to Serbia called for an unequivocal condemnation of propaganda directed against the Danube Monarchy, and lodged claims as to how this should occur. It also asked for the participation of Austrian delegates in suppressing any subversive efforts directed against the Habsburg Empire, as well as in investigating the murder. An answer was expected within 48 hours, i.e. by the evening of 25 July.

At first, the Serbian council of ministers showed a strong penchant to accommodate this request, and maybe it might have been even more pronounced, had Vienna made reference in its note to the fact that after the murder of Serbian ruler Duke Michael Obrenović in 1868, a Serbian prosecutor had conducted examinations in the Danube Monarchy. A call back to St. Petersburg was answered with the admonition to remain firm, which caused a change in opinion. Thus Serbia mobilised its forces on the afternoon of 25 July and handed over a rather conciliatory answer three hours later. Only the Austrian involvement in suppressing the subversive efforts and in investigating the murder was denied. At once, the Danube monarchy cancelled its diplomatic relations with Serbia. On the same day, Berchthold had it stated in St. Petersburg that should a battle with Serbia be foisted on Austria, this would not be about territorial gain but about defence, and that Serbian sovereignty would not be touched.

Czar Nicholas II had informally started mobilisation directly after the departure of his French guests on 24 July; the respective measures did not go unnoticed by German observers. The British navy was made ready for war on 26 July, and France called back all vacationers to their respective units. Formal Russian mobilisation against Austria-Hungary was ordered on 29 July, complete one day later. The German Empire tried to mediate until the last minute. On 28 July, the day of the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia, Emperor Wilhelm II. advised Vienna to stop in Belgrade, and even on 31 July, he urgently asked the Czar to avert the doom now facing the entire civilised world. Peace in Europe might still be kept if Russia stopped military actions threatening Germany and Austria-Hungary. Since Nicholas II. did not cancel the mobilisation order, the German Empire informed Russia on the evening of 1 August that it regarded the state of war to have occurred. On 3 August, it also declared war on France, after efforts to receive a declaration of neutrality from France had remained unsuccessful.

This was intended as a pre-emptive measure. France could not be left to choose the moment for attack; after all, German plans for a war on two fronts envisaged first turning west. The breach of Belgian neutrality by Germany, which at that point was only nominal, gave Grey the welcome opportunity to lead Great Britain into war on 4 August. Up to that point, public opinion had predominantly been in favour of steering clear of the strife on the Continent. During the crisis, Grey had been very insincere about his intentions towards German diplomats, misleading most of his cabinet colleagues, the House of Commons and the general public.

War Without End 8: The Old Order Changeth

The Treaty of Versailles, signed eventually on 28 June 1919, was uncompromising. Its legacy reaped a bitter harvest. Germany lost nearly one seventh of its territory and one tenth of its population. Half the iron ore and one quarter of the coal production as well as one seventh of agricultural production were taken from her. German colonies and all foreign possessions of the Reich were lost. Most of her commercial fleet had to be handed over and long-term economic discrimination endured. But on a deeper level, Germany lost more than just her wealth and her possessions. She lost a confidence in herself which created a political vacuum; a space for opportunism to grow like a cancerous tumour.

The army and navy were considerably reduced. The Rhineland was de-militarised, split in three zones and occupied by Allied forces for five to fifteen years. The Saarland was put under the mandate of the League of Nations. The coal mines went to France. Gdansk and its surrounding area was turned into a Free City of Poland with special rights. The independence of Austria, whose National Assembly had voted to accept the connection to the German Reich, was to be guaranteed in perpetuity. The amount of reparations was to be determined at a later time. That the sum to be compiled would be very high, was beyond doubt. The murdered Kitchener must have spun in his watery grave. This was not a just peace.

Before the signing of the treaty, President Wilson said that if he were a German, he would not sign it. His Foreign Minister Lansing considered the conditions imposed on Germany as unutterably hard and abasing, many of which could not possibly be met. His adviser, Mandell House wrote in his diary on 29 June that the treaty was bad and should never have been concluded; its execution would bring no end of difficulties over Europe. [1] As an understatement, Houses’s prediction stands absolutely proven.The real victors would not be swayed. The final Treaty stands testament to how little real influence Woodrow Wilson wielded in Europe.

The Versailles Peace Settlement was a stepping stone in itself to future wars. Diplomat-historian George F Kenan later wrote that the peace treaty ‘had the tragedies of the future written into it as if by the devil’s own hand.’  [2] As we have pointed out, by accepting Article 231, Germany was obliged to bear the burden of guilt for causing the war. Old Empires were dismantled and choice pickings reallocated. Gone was the German Empire and Queen Victoria’s grandson, the Kaiser. The Imperial Russian Empire was no more, its Czar Nicholas II, cousin of Britain’s King George V, executed by the very Bolsheviks whom American and British bankers had financed. The Ottoman Empire, ripped apart by the victors, offered the opportunity to redraw the Middle East with the lure of oil and prime strategic locations. The British Empire survived, but at a cost. Britain had sold off at least a quarter of its dollar investments and borrowed over £1,027,000,000 from the United States. [3] Consequently, the flow of capital from America to Europe reversed the pattern which had dominated the previous century. These immense changes represented a long-term financial realignment in favour of Wall Street.

The conclusion to First World War was not the beginning of the end but a building block towards disasters that were to come. A new Elite intended to control the peace and exert its influence through organisations which it created specifically to determine how that would be done. During the Peace Conference in Paris, Alfred Milner’s chief acolyte, Lionel Curtis, organised a joint conference of British and American ‘experts’ on foreign affairs at the Hotel Majestic. [4] The British contingent came almost exclusively from men and women identified by Professor Carroll Quigley as members of what we have termed The Secret Elite. [5] The American ‘experts’ came from banks, universities and institutions dominated by J.P. Morgan and members of the Carnegie Trust. [6] This alliance of international financial capitalism and political thinkers and manipulators began a new phase in the life of the secret cabal as they continued their drive to establish a new world order.

They took the successful Round Table Group and remodelled it into The Institute of International Affairs. Smothered in words which when decoded meant that they would work together to determine the future direction of a fast-changing world, Lionel Curtis advocated that ‘National Policy ought to be shaped by a conception of the interests of society at large.’ [7] By that he meant the interests of the Anglo-American Establishment. He talked of the settlements which had been made in Paris as a result of public opinion in various countries, and spelled out the need to differentiate between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ public opinion. With chilling certainty he announced that ‘Right public opinion was mainly produced by a small number of people in real contact with the facts who had thought out the issues involved.’139 He talked of the need to ‘to cultivate a public opinion in the various countries of the world’ and proposed the creation of a ‘strictly limited’ high-level think-tank comprising the like minded ‘experts’ from the British and American Delegations. A committee of selection, dominated entirely by Secret Elite agents was organised [8] to avoid ‘a great mass of incompetent members.’ What quintessentially British ruling-class thinking. A new Anglo-American Elite of approved membership was self-selected.

Thus the Institute of International Affairs, also known as Chatham House, was formally established in July 1920 and was granted a Royal charter in 1926. [9] Its first decision was to write a history of the Peace Conference. A committee to supervise these writings, in other words, ensure that the official history recorded only their version of events, was funded by a gift of £2,000 from Thomas Lamont of J.P. Morgan. Follow the money you will always trace the power behind the politicians. At the same time Institute’s sister organization, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), was created with J.P. Morgan money. Acting in close cooperation and funded by similar sources, the CFR and Chatham House ensured that the Britain and the United States followed similar foreign policies.

It is important to bear in mind that Curtis and his new updated organisation invited speakers to discuss and develop the ‘right’ opinion. That would have been why the first fully recorded meeting which was published in The Round Table Journal 142 in 1921 was given by D.G. Hogarth who served on the Arab Bureau during the war. He was a friend of T.E. Lawrence and Sir Mark Sykes, the men who betrayed the Arabs. Hogarth spoke on the Arab States an indication that this was one specific area for which the ‘right’ opinion had to be endorsed. [10] In 1922, Chaim Weizmann gave an address on Zionism. [11] His must have been the ‘right’ opinion too.

1. Professor Hans Fenske, A Peace to End All Peace https://firstworldwarhiddenhistory.wordpress.com//?s=Fenske&search=Go
2. Adam Hochschild, To End All Wars: A Story of Loyalty and Rebellion, p. 357.
3. David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, pp. 362-3.
4. The inaugural meeting to establish the Institute took place on 30 May 1919.
5. Gerry Docherty and Jim Macgregor, Hidden History, p.18.
6. Carroll Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment, pp. 182-183.
7. M.L. Dockrill, The Foreign Office and the ‘Proposed Institute of International Affairs 1919’ International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 56, No. 4 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 667.
8. Ibid., p. 666.
9. All of the senior organisers have been identified as members of the Secret Elite many times over; Lord Robert Cecil, Valentine Chirol, foreign editor of The Times, Geoffrey Dawson, G. W. Prothero etc.
10. Dockrill, The Foreign Office and the ‘Proposed Institute of International Affairs 1919’ International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 56, No. 4 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 671.
11. Docherty and Macgregor, Hidden History, chapter 11, pp. 153-160.
12. Both Hogarth and T.E. Lawrence were largely responsible for The Bulletin, a secret magazine of Middle East politics. Lawrence edited the first number on 6 June 1916 and thereafter sent numerous reports to it, enabling readers to follow, week by week, the Arab Revolt, which ended Ottoman domination in the Arabian peninsula. The British Foreign Office described it as: ‘A remarkable intelligence journal so strictly secret in its matter that only some thirty copies of each issue were struck off… Nor might the journal be quoted from, even in secret communications. http://www.archiveeditions.co.uk/titledetails.asp?tid=7
13. Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment, p. 185.

Verborgene Geschichte

Eine geheime Elite wollte den Krieg Die weithin für richtig gehaltene Ansicht, das Deutsche Reich trage den überwiegenden Teil der Verantwortung für den Kriegsausbruch 1914, wird zunehmend infrage gestellt. Die beiden britischen Historiker Gerry Docherty und Jim Macgregor richten den Fokus auf einen einflussreichen Zirkel in Großbritannien, der lange vor Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs die militärische Niederwerfung Deutschlands anstrebte: »Seit bald einem Jahrhundert wird erfolgreich vertuscht, wie alles begann und warum der Krieg unnötig und vorsätzlich über das Jahr 1915 hinaus verlängert wurde. Sorgfältig wurde die Geschichte verzerrt, um die Tatsache zu verschleiern, dass Großbritannien und nicht Deutschland für den Krieg verantwortlich war.« Verborgene Geschichte enthüllt, wer in Wahrheit für den Ersten Weltkrieg verantwortlich ist. Die Autoren belegen, dass die Berichterstattung über die Kriegsgründe vorsätzlich verfälscht wurde, um eine geheime Elite sehr wohlhabender und einflussreicher Männer in London zu schützen. Zehn Jahre lang arbeiteten sie auf die Vernichtung Deutschlands hin. Unser Bild von den damaligen Ereignissen wird von Unwahrheiten und Täuschungen geprägt, von einem ganzen Netz aus Lügen, das die Siegernationen 1919 in Versailles sorgfältig gestrickt haben und für dessen Fortbestand gefügige Historiker seitdem sorgen. Die offizielle Version der Kriegsgründe weist massive Fehler auf und wird verzerrt durch die Berge an Beweisen, die vernichtet wurden oder noch heute der Öffentlichkeit vorenthalten werden. Darunter allein 375.000 Bände geheimer Kriegsunterlagen! Verborgene Geschichte ist eine faszinierende Herausforderung. Die Autoren bitten Sie nur um eines: Sehen Sie sich unvoreingenommen an, was sie an Fakten zusammengetragen haben … »Auf Anregung des entschiedenen Imperialisten Cecil Rhodes traten 1891 einflussreiche Briten und Amerikaner zu einer Geheimgesellschaft zusammen. Sie wollten die weltweite Dominanz der beiden angelsächsischen Mächte herbeiführen und dauerhaft sichern. Für dieses Ziel wirkten sie ganz im Verborgenen. Die wachsende wirtschaftliche Stärke des Deutschen Reiches sahen sie mit großem Unbehagen. Auf die britische Außenpolitik hatte dieser nicht sehr große Kreis erheblichen Einfluss, zumal nachdem sein führendes Mitglied Sir Edward Grey Ende 1905 britischer Außenminister geworden war. Gerry Docherty und Jim Macgregor weisen in ihrem auf einer breiten Quellenbasis beruhenden Buch überzeugend nach, dass der Anteil Großbritanniens am Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs sehr viel größer war, als gemeinhin angenommen wird.« Prof. Dr. Hans Fenske

Verborgene Geschichte ist erhältlich bei einem unabhängigen Herausgeber Kopp Verlag plus Amazon Germany and Amazon UK.

Hidden History

Hidden History, The Secret Origins of the First World War uniquely exposes those responsible for the First World War.  It reveals how accounts of the war’s origins have been deliberately falsified to conceal the guilt of the secret cabal of very rich and powerful men in London responsible for the most heinous crime perpetrated on humanity.  For ten years, they plotted the destruction of Germany as the first stage of their plan to take control of the world.  The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was no chance happening.  It lit a fuse that had been carefully set through a chain of command stretching from Sarajevo through Belgrade and St Petersburg to that cabal in London.

Our understanding of these events has been firmly trapped in a web of falsehood and duplicity carefully constructed by the victors at Versailles in 1919 and maintained by compliant historians ever since.  The official version is fatally flawed, warped by the volume of evidence they destroyed or concealed from public view. Hidden History poses a tantalising challenge.  The authors ask only that you examine the evidence they lay before you.

Hidden History, The Secret Origins of the First World War by Gerry Docherty and Jim Macgregor is available from most leading bookshops and also through Amazon, Alibris, etc.

‘A most remarkable book about the true origins of the First World War.’ Will Podmore, author British Foreign Policy Since 1870.

‘This book is a triumph and an essential counterbalance to a century of establishment propaganda posing as history.’ Dr John O’Dowd, Glasgow University.

‘A wonderful book and very brave and bold attempt to confront the long held shibboleths on the origins of the war. I have struggled with “official” scrubbed-up versions for years.’ Yvonne McEwen, Edinburgh University.

‘I have read this book with much interest and profited greatly from it.’ Professor Hans Fenske, author Der Anfang von Ende des alten Europe.

‘This is a hugely important book on the war’s origin. It is absolutely necessary that this book is translated into German. Wolfgang Effenberger, author, Pfeiler der US-Macht.

‘Docherty and Macgregor do not mince their words. They present powerful arguments in this thought provoking book.’ John Grehan, The History Herald blog.

‘A really important ground breaking book.’ Pat Mills, author Charley’s War.

‘Hidden History should be a template for historians and reporters to chronicle the true causes of other wars. But beware! This book could affect you. It is not for the faint-of-heart.’ Tom Cahill, freelance American journalist.

‘Gerry Docherty and Jim Macgregor should be proud of their unstinting work and historical analyses of the origins of the Great War and in the meticulous way they unravel and unmask the genesis of that unparalleled war of human carnage.’ Patrick Scott Hogg, author, The Patriot Bard.

‘This book isn’t for people who find comfort in conventional explanations of 20th century history. For those with more open minds it will provide plenty of ammunition to blow away the myths propagated by the official histories.’ Marcus Laver, Amazon reviewer.

‘This is no conspiracy theory nonsense. It is well researched, verifiable history and all the more chilling for that. It is a book that will cause thought, research and debate, and for that reason alone deserves the widest possible audience.’ Steve Earles, Destructive Music blog.

‘I thank the authors of Hidden History most warmly and draw people’s attention to it wherever I lecture in this country The next 4 years will be an uphill struggle, given the level of propaganda from the Establishment, but as ‘they’ say, truth will out in the end.’ Terry Boardman author and political commentator.

‘I have delved enough into related publications to be convinced that Hidden History is a serious attempt to uncover how British imperial strategy really developed, in the aftermath of the negative experience of the Boer War, in the direction of instigating a war to destroy Germany while making it look like Germany initiated it. May I urge anyone considering writing about Larne and Howth in centenary mode not to do so without having read this book.’ Dr Roy H.W. Johnston. Irish writer and political commentator.